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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, it has been observed that IPOs are routinely underpriced (sold at a discount) at their initial offering, which represents a systematic failure of the marketplace and directly challenges standard economic theory (Ibbotson, 1975) . IPO underpricing appears pervasive across capital markets throughout the world, with IPO underpricing in a sample of 49 countries ranging, on average and by country, from 3.5 to 56 percent (Boulton, Smart, and Zutter, 2010) .
The dominant explanation for underpricing has been based on the assumption that asymmetric information creates a moral hazard due to a principal-agent and/or principal-principal conflict (Ritter, 2003) . However, this traditional line of thinking has received relatively limited empirical support (Daily et al., 2003; Ritter and Welch, 2002) . In addition, most prior work has ignored differences in the environment external to the firm to explain underpricing, as home-country characteristics have repeatedly been shown to influence IPO outcomes (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stultz, 2011) .
In this study, we take a fresh theoretical perspective by framing our investigation using the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm (Grant, 1996) within a cross-national sample of firms. Specifically, we explore the notion that the knowledge possessed by the board of directors directly influences the level of underpricing experienced by "entrepreneurial threshold firms" entering public equity markets (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004) . In addition, we explore the idea that the specific environment in which firms operate can provide firms with more or less knowledge (Reus et al., 2009) , thereby influencing the impact of the board on IPO underpricing.
By examining both the direct effect of board knowledge and the interaction effect between board knowledge and knowledge external to the firm on IPO underpricing, our study provides key new insights on board governance effectiveness. In addition, this study is responsive to recent calls to consider cross-national differences regarding governance behaviors and outcomes (Moore et al., 2012) . Therefore, ours is the first multilevel study to apply the KBV to a cross-national sample of firms to better understand IPO underpricing differences.
A KNOWLEDGE-BASED VIEW OF IPO UNDERPRICING
The KBV focuses on key knowledge workers operating inside the firm to explain organizational outcomes. The theory and research have repeatedly shown that the overall state of knowledge varies by firm, and that a greater extent of firm knowledge tends to be associated with desirable firm outcomes (Grant, 1996) . Because the IPO process involves the assembly and distribution of new knowledge and information as the firm attempts to attract new investors and convey its "true" value to public-market investors (Ritter and Welch, 2002) , it may be a useful framework to explore the determinants of underpricing outcomes.
The few empirical studies utilizing the KBV to explain IPO outcomes seem to support the validity of this theoretical framework in the exploration of IPO outcomes. For example, Bach, Judge, and Dean (2008) found that its predictions were helpful in explaining long-term IPO performance for computer firms going public for the first time in the United States. More recently, Arend, Patel, and Park (2014) demonstrated that KBV predictions are fairly well supported in explaining moderate and long-term IPO outcomes for high-technology manufacturing firms based in the United States.
Based on this recent and encouraging empirical support for the KBV with respect to IPO outcomes, we focus on the potential influence of board knowledge on IPO underpricing in this study. Board members are key decision makers in the IPO process and have a major influence on its eventual outcomes (Sanford, 2012) . Moreover, previous studies have provided empirical support regarding the significant role of board knowledge in affecting a number of firm outcomes. For example, Filatotchev et al. (2003) empirically demonstrated that board knowledge was positively associated with firm restructuring in transition economies. More recently, Barroso, Villegas, and Perez-Calero (2011) showed that board knowledge was positively associated with international diversification of Spanish firms. And most relevant to this study, Bedard, Coulombe, and Courteau (2008) found that board knowledge was negatively associated with IPO underpricing in Canadian firms.
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Internal board knowledge and IPO underpricing
While top management, working in concert with external advisors, often does most of the work related to going public, it is the board's responsibility to understand the information presented, to challenge underlying assumptions, and, ultimately, to direct the overall process and decide on the offering price and specific timing of the IPO. In other words, a broad coalition of managers and advisors all contribute to determining the initial offering price (Pollock, Porac, and Wade, 2004) , but it is the board of directors that is central to this process, and the focus of this study.
One of the key handbooks on undertaking an IPO describes the board's role as follows:
The board's fiduciary duties and oversight responsibilities naturally extend to the IPO process. Among other things, the board-directly or, for some matters, through committees-must make the threshold decision to pursue an IPO; select the managing underwriters; ensure that appropriate policies, controls, and procedures are in place; establish an appropriate governance structure; approve various matters related to the IPO; reassess compensation programs in the context of becoming a public company; oversee the preparation of the registration documents; and authorize the filing of, and sign them (Westenberg, 2011: 10-18) .
A knowledgeable board that skillfully manages this process is expected to enhance the firm's absorptive capacity-its ability to value, assimilate, and apply new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 )-with respect to the process of going public. Zahra and George (2002) argued that absorptive capacity is a set of knowledge creation routines by which firms acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit knowledge to produce a more dynamic organizational capability. Because boards of directors have both economic and legal incentives to optimize the IPO process, we would expect them to use their knowledge to minimize or eliminate underpricing. Therefore, the collective knowledge assembled within the board should improve the effectiveness of the overall IPO process, which is generally considered to be a successful offering of stocks to public equity markets with minimal or nonexistent underpricing.
Previous KBV literature has suggested that knowledge can be characterized in two ways-its breadth and its depth (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996) . In this case, the board's breadth of knowledge refers to the extent to which its collective set of experiences and expertise spans multiple domains (i.e., general business knowledge). For example, boards with relatively broad sets of general knowledge would be expected to exercise skill in managing the overall IPO process by selecting the most competent underwriters, allowing dissenting opinions within the boardroom to be aired, resolving conflicts in a timely fashion, and ultimately choosing the most appropriate offering price.
In contrast, the depth of knowledge refers to the extent to which the board possesses highly sophisticated and specialized expertise regarding the technical aspects of the IPO process. For example, boards with relatively deep knowledge would be expected to exercise skill in navigating the technicalities of the new offering by bringing in legal, accounting, and financial expertise to bear on boardroom deliberations.
In sum, boards of directors that possess a broad and/or deep knowledge base are expected to expand the firm's absorptive capacity with respect to the IPO process. This enhanced absorptive capacity should translate into a better managed IPO process, a more accurate offering price, and therefore lower levels of underpricing. In contrast, boards lacking broad and/or deep levels of knowledge are expected to have more difficulty in managing the IPO process and assessing the firm's true value. This lack of knowledge should translate into a lower offering price, and hence higher underpricing in order to attract potential investors and to avoid risk of partial subscription or selling of shares. This suggests the following two relationships: 
Internal and external knowledge's interactive effect on IPO underpricing
The KBV is a theory of the firm, so its primary focus has been on the knowledge and learning occurring within the firm to influence organizational outcomes. However, knowledge workers within the firm often seek knowledge external to its boundaries, integrating that external knowledge with their internal knowledge to inform strategic choices (Grant, 1996) . Hence, the KBV emphasizes that internal knowledge must be considered within the context of the external knowledge circulating within the firm's environment (Nonaka, 1994; Reus et al., 2009) .
Based on KBV and absorptive capacity literatures, we would expect that boards of directors with relatively broad and deep levels of knowledge are in a better position to take advantage of useful knowledge external to the firm than boards of directors with relatively low levels of knowledge (Zahra and George, 2002) . In other words, as boards expand the absorptive capacity of the firm, the KBV predicts that these more knowledgeable boards will be in a better position to be aware of, assimilate, and apply any or all relevant knowledge from the external environment in order to govern the corporation well (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004) . We therefore expect that internal knowledge is complementary with external knowledge as boards direct the IPO process.
With respect to IPO underpricing, this suggests that the breadth or depth of knowledge operating within the board should enable the board to capitalize on the breadth or depth of knowledge external to the firm. Specifically, boards possessing a relatively broad range of general knowledge and/or a relatively deep technical knowledge about the IPO event should be better positioned to take advantage of extensive knowledge external to the firm. For example, a board with a broad range of knowledge would be expected to operate with directors broadly knowledgeable about business in general, such as its overall understanding of the economy. If these directors operated in an environment with relatively extensive available information on the overall economy, they should be better able to make decisions that enhance the IPO offering.
Similarly, a board operating with relatively deep understanding of the technicalities associated with the IPO event operating within an external environment with relatively extensive information on the legal, accounting, and financial aspects associated with IPOs should be better positioned to make decisions that enhance the IPO offering. For instance, board members with strong technical expertise may be better able to accurately price the firm's share when information about related IPOs is available in the external environment, as such information allows them to utilize their knowledge capacity to assimilate and utilize such IPO-related external knowledge in the economy. In sum, this literature and logic suggests that the state of knowledge within the board should complement the state of knowledge in the external environment. More formally: 
RESEARCH METHODS
Data collection procedures
The most common source of IPO data is the SDC Platinum database, provided by Thomson Reuters. However, due to considerable problems with its accuracy (see Ritter, 2012) and the absence of several important firm-level indicators required by our study, we resolved to hand collect our own dataset with a wide range of country experts intimately familiar with the environment of their designated economy. When the country experts and corresponding sample of countries had been selected, we utilized the annual editions of the EurIPO Fact Books (Paleari et al., 2006 (Paleari et al., , 2007 (Paleari et al., , 2008 to identify IPOs for these countries. Our study period ranges from 2006 to 2008 and covers both hot and cold market conditions that have been shown to influence IPO processes (Derrien, 2005) .
Data were collected through careful reading and analysis of IPO prospectuses by the country experts. All IPOs require a prospectus providing a general overview for potential investors to consider. Each prospectus contained the following two sets of information: (1) firm characteristics (e.g., founding date, financial trends, and offering price), and (2) details on key top managers and all board members (e.g., age, ownership stakes, functional background, and tenure with the firm).
In order to guide data gathering and ensure consistency, the project leaders developed a data-collection template that was distributed to all participating country experts. As Aggarwal et al. (2009) observed, there are important but subtle differences in governance measures throughout the world, and our research team was able to deliberate on these differences and reconcile them in a systematic fashion. The country experts collected and coded the firm-level variables according to this template. In several instances, country-specific queries raised by country experts were discussed and resolved by the project leaders in order to reflect country-specific peculiarities and ensure data consistency. Overall, this process yielded a complete data set of 978 IPO firms from 17 countries representing over 60 percent of global gross domestic product.
Variables and measures
In this study, we had one dependent variable-IPO underpricing. Consistent with our earlier literature and logic, board knowledge was measured in terms of its breadth and depth (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996) . Similarly, and based on prior research, we also distinguish between the two dimensions of breadth and depth for external knowledge (Barro and Lee, 2001; Ritter and Welch, 2002) . These dependent and independent measures, as well as our controls, mainly borrowed from agency theory and previous research done using U.S. samples, are listed in Table 1 . The descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all our measures are listed in Table 2 .
Analytical method
We used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) as implemented in Stata 13.1 to test our hypotheses. This technique is appropriate because our observations are embedded in two hierarchically nested levels of analysis-country and industry-that may be sources of nonindependence among observations (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002) . The ICC (1) intraclass correlation coefficient (see Bliese, 2000) is 0.28 at the country level (p < 0.001) and 0.11 at industry level (p < 0.01), suggesting that the most important source of nonindependence is the country level; we took this into account by specifying our model as a two-level hierarchical model with observations nested in countries and controls for industries at the two-digit ISIC 4 level. In Model 3, we regressed our controls, main effects, and interaction effects of board and external knowledge breadth and depth. Indicators of fit improve significantly. Notably, all four interactions are statistically significant, but three are statistically significant opposite to the hypothesized direction. The only interaction demonstrating a complementary relationship was between board knowledge depth and external knowledge depth, though only marginal (p < 0.10). In sum, our data provide limited support for the complementary relationship proposed by the KBV in Hypothesis 2b. In contrast, our data predominantly suggest a substitution relationship between internal and external knowledge with respect to IPO underpricing. Furthermore, we conducted several robustness tests using alternative national indicators, a variety of model specifications, and multiple tests to rule out endogeneity concerns. Our findings were robust, and specific details can be obtained by contacting the authors directly.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study uses the KBV to describe and explain IPO underpricing across multiple levels of analysis for a broad cross-national sample of firms (Daily et al., 2003) .
IPO prospectus
IPO leverage Log transformation of debt-to-equity ratio at time of IPO (Eckbo and Norli, 2005) Company financial statements IPO growth Previous three years of sales growth registered by pre-IPO firm (Florin, Lubatkin, and Schulze, 2003) Company financial statements IPO profitability Average three years of return on assets by pre-IPO firm (Florin et al., 2003) Company financial statements Family ownership Proportion of shares held by family members (Bruton et al., 2010) IPO prospectus
Venture capital ownership
Proportion of shares held by venture capital investors (Bruton et al., 2010) IPO prospectus Bank ownership Proportion of shares held by banks (Bruton et al., 2010 based in developed and emerging economies. Our results provide relatively strong support for its predictions related to board knowledge being inversely related to IPO underpricing. Specifically, both the breadth and depth of board knowledge were found to directly suppress IPO underpricing above and beyond our wide array of control variables. Traditional knowledge-based literature and logic argues that "more knowledge is better" (Zahra and George, 2002) . As a result, we hypothesized a complementary relationship between board knowledge and external knowledge and tested this prediction. Notably, all four of our interactions were significant, but three were in the opposite direction hypothesized, and the hypothesized relationship that was supported was only marginally significant. Specifically, it appears that boards with less knowledge benefit more from extensive external knowledge to overcome their knowledge gaps and to direct the IPO process with less underpricing. IPO underpricing was transformed using square root plus constant to avoid kurtosis and skewness problems. Issue size, IPO age, and IPO leverage were log-transformed to assure normality. Industry dummies for 62 ISIC industries are included, and specific details on coefficients can be provided upon request. Pseudo-R 2 calculated as: 1 -(residual variance)/(variance of square root of underpricing). ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.10
In contrast, boards with more extensive internal knowledge may overestimate their own knowledge and may not fully utilize external knowledge sources. These substitution effects directly challenge traditional absorptive capacity logic within the KBV, which argues for complementary effects. However, our findings are consistent with recent KBV studies, which have revealed that the specific relationship between external and internal knowledge depends on the nature of the situation.
Specifically, Fernhaber, McDougall-Covin, and Shepherd (2009) found that new ventures with limited internationally experienced top management benefited most from external international knowledge sources, suggesting a substitution relationship, contrary to traditional absorptive capacity arguments. Furthermore, Xu, Wu, and Cavusgil (2013) showed that external knowledge often substitutes for internal knowledge when the firm is pursuing radical innovation. Overall, this literature and our data seem to suggest that, when a firm is confronted by nonroutine and complex situations, external knowledge can and often does substitute for internal knowledge.
The only instance where we found a complementary relationship between internal and external knowledge was with board knowledge depth and external knowledge depth. This finding suggests that the depth dimension of knowledge within the board coupled with the depth dimension of knowledge external to the firm is the only area where a complementary relationship between internal and external knowledge sourcing may exist. In other words, it takes deep knowledge within the board in order to access and utilize deep knowledge in the external environment. While this finding was only marginally significant, its implications are interesting and significant for future KBV research because it highlights different interactive effects between the breadth and depth of knowledge internal and external to the firm.
In sum, we found that, with respect to IPO underpricing, more knowledge is not always better when considering interaction between internal and external sources of knowledge. Our data suggest that when a firm is confronted by a nonroutine complex decision, such as entering public equity markets, only the depth of internal knowledge is complementary with the depth of external knowledge. In contrast, all other interactions between internal and external knowledge lead to substitution outcomes. While this is speculative, it may be that less knowledgeable boards are often more highly motivated to search out and rely on external knowledge than are more knowledgeable boards (Menon and Pfeffer, 2003) .
Conclusions and implications
The primary contribution of our study is to help demystify the IPO underpricing market anomaly by utilizing a new theoretical perspective and analyzing a broad sample of firms in a wide variety of economies using multilevel modeling techniques. Consistent with Lubatkin et al. (2005) , we find that predictors based on the most popular theoretical framework for exploring underpricing, agency theory, have relatively little explanatory leverage in a cross-national context. Furthermore, we show that most of the variables found to be salient predictors of underpricing in the U.S. IPO market (i.e., prior growth, issue size, leverage, profitability, venture capital ownership) do not have much explanatory power in our cross-national sample.
In contrast, our results suggest that KBV predictions regarding the extent of knowledge possessed by boards of directors are more powerful in explaining first-day IPO returns for a more globally representative set of firms. In particular, our results indicate that broad and deep knowledge possessed by the board of directors may enable the board to more properly manage the IPO process and accurately price the IPO prior to going public. Our findings also suggest that the external environment can often substitute for internal board knowledge, and that the joint knowledge impact varies in terms of breadth and depth considered. As such, our findings reveal that KBV dynamics often vary from economy to economy, depending on the knowledge possessed by the board and the extent of knowledge circulating within the overall economy. Consequently, previous KBV and underpricing insights generated just within the U.S. context may not be generalizable to other economies.
In addition, we make an important methodological contribution to empirical research on IPO underpricing in particular, and cross-national research on corporate governance more generally. To our knowledge, this is the first study exploring multilevel explanations of IPO underpricing using HLM techniques in a cross-national sample. While Engelen and Van Essen (2010) used HLM to examine underpricing, their theoretical focus was exclusively on the effects of national legal frameworks on IPO outcomes. The vast majority of prior cross-national studies of IPO underpricing (e.g., Banerjee, Dai, and Shrestha, 2011; Boulton et al., 2010) applied ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques to nested data in which individual observations are subject to both industry-and country-level effects. This approach likely violates the IID assumption of OLS, which may artificially reduce the standard errors of the estimates and inflate confidence levels (cf. Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002) . Consequently, the statistical significance of these OLS-based findings may be in doubt. Using HLM, this paper takes into account these methodological issues and may set a standard for future research.
Our study also makes important contributions to the literature on international corporate governance. First, our findings add empirical evidence to the argument that agency explanations may be rather limited in the global economy (Lubatkin et al., Corporate Governance and IPO Underpricing 1183 2005) , as this perspective largely reflects governance peculiarities and the institutional context of established Anglo-American firms with dispersed ownership (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009) . If neoclassical economic assumptions are relaxed, the theoretical contribution of agency theory becomes rather restricted (Aguilera and Williams, 2009; Judge, Gaur, and Muller-Kahle, 2010) . Clearly, there will always be monitoring and control issues to which boards must attend. However, our study reveals that traditional structural proxies for monitoring and controlling the firm were inconsequential for explaining IPO underpricing in a cross-national context. At the very least, agency theorists should consider using alternative measures that more closely approximate actual board monitoring and control activities rather than the traditional structural proxies (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003) .
Second, our study suggests that the KBV may be a useful alternative perspective for explaining corporate governance processes and outcomes. The KBV argues that firms with more extensive knowledge are advantageously positioned to perform in a knowledge-based global economy (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004) . Our results show that this is not always the case, but it would be interesting to see if they can be extended also to other corporate governance outcomes in more mature and established firms.
Third, our study strongly supports scholars arguing that national context influences corporate governance practices and outcomes, and that the Anglo-American governance environment is quite different from elsewhere (e.g., Judge et al., 2010; Li and Samsell, 2009; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008) . In addition, our findings break new ground by exploring how the state of internal knowledge interacts with external knowledge to influence governance outcomes. As such, our study lends further support to the notion that country does indeed matter when attempting to understand organizational outcomes (Makino, Isobe, and Chan, 2004) .
These empirical insights have a number of important practical implications. They show that board knowledge can have a substantive direct impact on IPO outcomes. Specifically, an increase in the board knowledge breadth by one standard deviation from the mean in an environment with external knowledge breadth one standard deviation below the mean changes underpricing from a mean of 0.31 (underpricing) to -0.04 (overpricing). This elimination of underpricing represents millions of dollars to pre-IPO investors for each IPO. As such, treating the board as "window dressing" may not be a very practical decision (Chen, Hambrick, and Pollock, 2008) .
A final practical implication of our analysis reveals that IPO underpricing is influenced at both the firm and national levels. Notably, the value of board knowledge appears to be most significant for less-developed economies, counter to Crossland and Hambrick's executive discretion research (2011). Clearly, we have just scratched the surface of our understanding on how cross-national corporate governance mechanisms interact to yield firm-specific outcomes in a globally representative set of firms (Judge, 2009 ). The KBV warrants further studies to learn whether our findings hold in other time periods using more refined measures of internal and external knowledge in other cross-national contexts.
